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project. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for reasons different than those offered by the
district court.
Lisa M. Thompson

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Am. Canoe Ass'n, Inc. v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505 (4th Cir.
2003) (holding that plaintiffs bringing a citizen suit under the Clean
Water Act satisfied the injury in fact and traceability requirements for
Article III standing by showing (1) concerns regarding water quality
affecting their recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests; (2)
testimony that a defendant discharged pollutants within the specific
geographic area of concern; and (3) evidence the pollutant was
capable of causing kind the of injuries plaintiffs alleged).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision addressed whether
Canoe Association, Professional Paddlesports
the American
Association, and Conservation Council of North Carolina
("Environmental Groups") had standing to sue two jointly operating
North Carolina hog farms in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina under the Clean Water Act's
("CWA") citizen suit provision. Specifically, the Environmental
Groups claimed that D.M. Farms of Rose Hill LLC and Murphy Farms
Inc. ("Hog Farmers") violated the CWA by discharging swine waste
into Six Runs Creek without a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. Prior to this suit, the Hog
Farmers operated under a North Carolina Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Animal Waste Management Plan
("State Plan") that prohibited animal waste discharges to surface
waters. As a result, the Hog Farmers had not applied for an NPDES
permit. However, on two occasions while operating under the State
Plan, the Hog Farmers discharged animal waste into waters of the
United States without an NPDES permit.
The Environmental Groups sued the Hog Farmers for failing to
obtain an NPDES permit and for discharging waste without an NPDES
permit. The district court granted the Environmental Groups' motion
for preliminary injunction, thereby requiring the Hog Farmers to
apply for an NPDES permit. The district court also granted partial
summary judgment to the Environmental Groups on the claims that
the discharges violated the CWA. The Hog Farmers appealed. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded the
preliminary injunction issue to the district court for a mootness
inquiry and declined to review the partial summaryjudgment ruling.
On remand, both parties entered into a consent decree,
contingent on the Environmental Groups prevailing over the Hog
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Farmers' motions challenging the Environmental Groups' jurisdiction
and standing to sue under the CWA's citizen suit provision. The
Environmental Groups prevailed on the motions and the district court
entered a final judgment in accordance with the consent decree. The
Hog Farmers appealed again, and in this decision the Fourth Circuit
ruled whether the Environmental Groups (1) had standing to sue, and
(2) had shown the Hog Farmers' violations were ongoing at the time
of suit.
The Hog Farmers argued the Environmental Groups lacked Article
III standing because the Environmental Groups' members lacked
standing in their own right. The Fourth Circuit's analysis began with
the test outlined in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission, which held an association establishes standing when "(a)
its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;
(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." The
Hog Farmers focused on the first prong of the test and claimed the
Environmental Groups' individual members lacked standing in their
own right because the Environmental Groups' members were not in
an area impacted by the discharges, and discharges from other farms
caused any injuries the plaintiffs might have suffered.
The court held the Environmental Groups had standing to sue.
An individual must demonstrate three requirements for Article III
standing: an injury in fact, traceability, and redressability. The Hog
Farmers claimed the Environmental Groups lacked injury in fact and
traceability. The court relied upon Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services and Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Cpper Recycling
Corporation as authority for resolving the factual issue of whether
members of the Environmental Groups had standing to sue. The
Fourth Circuit noted that although this case presented fewer
discharges than both the Laidlaw and Gaston Copper cases, the
testimony of members established an injury in fact because the
members alleged harm to their recreational, aesthetic, and
commercial interests and were within the area around the time of the
discharges.
The Fourth Circuit also addressed the traceability issue. To show
addressability, the Environmental Groups needed to show the Hog
Farmers' discharges caused or contributed to the kinds of injuries that
the members alleged in the specific area of concern. The Fourth
Circuit noted it was uncontroverted that the Hog Farmers discharged
large quantities of hog waste, and that hog waste can cause the type of
The court also relied on the
injuries the members alleged.
Environmental Groups' expert testimony in holding that the Hog
Farmers discharges reached the geographic area of concern. The Hog
Farmers' argument that the Environmental Groups could not prove
traceability because other farmers who lived upstream might have
caused the contamination failed to persuade the Fourth Circuit. In
holding the Environmental Groups showed traceability, and ultimately
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had standing to sue, the Fourth Circuit noted that while other farmers
may have discharged upstream, the upstream discharges did not
negate the fact that the Hog Farmers' discharges might have harmed
the Environmental Groups.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of continued
violations. A plaintiff seeking to sue under the citizen suit provision of
the Clean Water Act must prove that the defendant's CWA violations
were ongoing at the time of suit. The Fourth Circuit held that the
district court erroneously decided the Environmental Groups had
CWAjurisdiction and that the district court made its decision without
the requisite factual development. Thus, the Fourth Circuit vacated
the district court's decision and remanded the continued violations
issue to the district court.
Ad-riano Martinez

Treacyv. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act
applies to any branch of a tributary system which eventually flows into
a navigable body of water).
The Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), pursuant to its authority
under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), brought a civil enforcement
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia to prevent Newdunn Associates, Orion Associates, and
Northwest Contractors (collectively "Newdunn") from ditching and
draining wetlands on forty-three acres near Newport News, Virginia.
The Virginia State Water Control Board ("Board") initiated a separate
enforcement action in state court, premised on the Virginia Nontidal
Wetlands Resources Act of 2000 ("Virginia Act").
Newdunn
successfully removed the state action to federal court, which
consolidated the two cases and denied the Board's motion to remand
for lack of jurisdiction. The district court ruled for Newdunn in both
cases, finding that the Corps lacked jurisdiction over wetlands on the
Newdunn Property under the CWA, and that the jurisdictional reach
of Virginia law was coextensive with federal law.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals first considered
whether a federal question existed to provide a proper basis for
removing the Board's case to federal court. Because the Newdunn
property contained land that satisfied both the Virginia and federal
definitions of "wetlands," the court held there was no tension between
the two laws, and thus, there could be no federal question jurisdiction
based on Virginia's decision to adopt the Corps' definition of
"wetlands." Moreover, the Virginia Act gave jurisdiction over all of the
state's waters to the Board, underscoring the lack of federal
involvement.
Newdunn argued that the Board and Corps' jurisdiction was
coextensive because Virginia code stated that certain state permits

